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l 
Digest: Richardson v. Superior Court 
Holly Buchanan 
Opinion by Moreno, J., with Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and 
Corrigan, J. Dissenting Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J. 
Issues 
( 1) What is the correct standard of review for a ruling on a motion for 
DNA testing under Penal Code section 1405? 
(2) What must be established to satisfy the "materiality" and 
"reasonable probability" requirements under Section 1405? 
Facts 
On September 12, 1989, petltwner Charles Keith Richardson was 
charged with residential burglary, rape, sodomy, "lewd and lascivious acts 
on a child under the age of 14," and the murder of eleven-year-old April 
Holley.' Four pubic hair samples recovered from the crime scene were 
admitted at trial.2 The prosecution's hair analysis experts disputed whether 
all four of the samples matched petitioner's DNA.3 Petitioner's experts 
disagreed with the conclusions of the prosecution's experts that any of the 
hair samples were consistent with the petitioner's.4 Petitioner was 
convicted on all counts and sentenced to death.5 Upon automatic appeal to 
the Supreme Court of California, the Court affirmed the judgment.6 
On May 24, 2004, petitioner filed a motion under Section 1405 
seeking DNA testing of the hair samples.7 The trial court denied the 
motion because petitioner failed to show that the evidence was material and 
that there was a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more 
favorable result. 8 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or 
prohibition.9 The Supreme Court of California denied the petition. 10 
1 Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Cal. 2008). 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. 
R !d. at 1201-02. 
9 !d. at 1202. 
10 !d. at 1208. 
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Analysis 
1. Relevant Subdivisions of Section 1405 
Section 1405(a) provides that an inmate convicted of a felony may 
make a written motion for DNA testing of evidence. 11 The trial court may 
only grant the motion if eight conditions are metY Subdivision (f)( 4) 
requires the moving party to make a prima facie showing that "the evidence 
sought to be tested is material to the issue ofthe convicted person's identity 
as the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, special circumstance, or 
enhancement allegation that resulted in the conviction or sentence."13 
Subdivision (f)(5) requires the moving party to make a prima facie showing 
that "[t]he requested DNA testing results would raise a reasonable 
probability that the convicted person's verdict or sentence would have been 
favorable if the results of DNA testing had been available at the time of 
conviction."14 Subdivision G) authorizes appellate review of the order 
granting or denying the motion through a writ of mandate or prohibition. 15 
2. Standard of Review 
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the correct standard of 
review for a Section 1405 motion is substantial evidence. 16 The Court said 
that the correct standard is abuse of discretion, because a trial court must 
weigh the evidence in determining whether the requirements of the statute 
have been met. 17 The Court found this conclusion supported by comparing 
the statute's purpose to Penal Code section 1181 (8), which authorizes a 
trial court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 18 The 
standard of review of a trial court's denial of a new trial under Section 
1181 is abuse of discretion. 19 
3. Meaning of "Materiality" and "Reasonable Probability" 
The Court noted that Section 1405(f)(4) does not define "material."20 
The Court found that the test for materiality differs in other contexts. 21 The 
standard used in Pitchess v. Superior Court requires a showing that the 
evidence be admissible.22 The standard used in Brady v. Maryland, on the 
other hand, requires a showing that there be a reasonable probability that 
the result of the trial would have been more favorable. 23 The Court adopted 
II /d. at 1202 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1405(a) (2005)). 
12 !d. 
13 !d. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405( f)( 4) (2005 )). 
14 !d. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1405(t)(5) (2005)). 
15 !d. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1405(j) (2005)). 
16 !d. at 1202-03. 
17 !d. at 1203. 
18 !d. 
19 !d. 
20 !d. at 1204. 
21 !d. 
22 !d. (citing Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974)). 
23 !d. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
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the lower Pitchess threshold because that case, like Section 1405(£)(4), 
concerned the discovery of evidence.24 The Court found this conclusion to 
be supported by the legislative history. 25 
The Court noted that the term "reasonable probability" has been 
interpreted by courts in other contexts to mean a reasonable probability that 
the result would have been more favorable in the absence of the error.26 
The Court adopted this interpretation, concluding that Section 1405(f)(5) 
requires the defendant to show that, "had the DNA testing been available, 
in light of all the evidence, there is a reasonable probability-that is, a 
reasonable chance and not merely an abstract possibility-that the 
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. "27 
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court concluded that 
petitioner had established that the DNA test of the hair samples would have 
been material to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator. 28 But the Court 
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's 
motion because the court found that there was other substantial evidence 
linking him to the crime. 29 Since the hair samples were not conclusive on 
the issue of his guilt, the court found that he failed to satisfy the 
"reasonable probability" requirement. 30 
Holding 
The Court held that the correct standard of review for a trial court's 
denial of DNA testing of newly discovered evidence under Section 1405 is 
abuse of discretionY The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying petitioner's Section 1405 motion because he failed 
to establish that there was a "reasonable probability" of a more favorable 
result.32 The Court discharged the order to show cause and denied the 
petition. 33 
Dissent 
Justice Chin decried the expense of the four years of litigation created 
by the trial court's ruling. 34 He said that the majority interpreted 
subdivision (f)(5) too literally and that this section does not require such 
24 !d. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 1205 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (!984); People v. Watson, 299 P.2d 
243 (1956)). 
27 !d. 
2R !d. at 1206. 
29 Jd 
30 !d. at 1206-07. 
31 Jd at 1203. 
32 !d. at 1206. 
33 !d. at 1208. 
34 !d. at 1208 ·09. 
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extensive and thorough analysis of the evidence. 35 He said that "the 
Legislature did not intend to make litigation over whether to conduct 
testing more time-consuming and costly than the testing itself."36 
Instead, Justice Chin explained, Section 1405 should be interpreted to 
"require only a preliminary assessment of whether testing results would 
raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome.'m He said that this 
assessment should be based on the evidence and arguments set forth in the 
motion for testing itself, not the entire trial court record.38 This, he said, 
would be consistent with legislative intent not to permit routine testing in 
all cases and would be less time-consuming and expensive.39 
Justice Chin recommended that the legislature amend Section 1405 to 
impose a lower threshold for DNA testing. 40 He also said that a 
preliminary assessment of the evidence in this case would have satisfied the 
requirements of Section 1405(f)(4) and (f)(5).41 
Legal Significance 
This decision clarifies the standard of review for a ruling on a motion 
for DNA testing and the "materiality" and "reasonable probability" 
requirements under Section 1405. The relatively low thresholds of 
materiality and reasonable probability will make it easier to prevail at the 
trial court level on a Section 1405 motion. The high abuse of discretion 
standard, however, will insulate the trial court's decision from review. 
35 !d. at 1209. 
36 ld. 
37 /d. 
38 ld. 
39 !d. at 1210. 
40 !d. 
41 Jd. 
